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1 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL v. 
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: IS THE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW “UNLAWFULLY 
WITHHELD” OR “ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS”? 
          EALR Staff*
Abstract: In 1977, the Food and Drug Administration initiated a process 
to withdraw approval of the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food pro-
ducing animals out of concern the use was not shown to be safe. Over 
thirty years later, the FDA still had not completed the process, prompting 
several nonprofit advocacy groups to seek a court order compelling ac-
tion. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admini-
stration, a federal district court considered whether the FDA unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed agency action in violation of the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The dis-
trict court applied the APA’s “unlawfully withheld” test, considered the 
plain meaning of the statute, and rendered a swift decision in favor of the 
plaintiffs. This Comment argues that applying the APA’s “arbitrary and 
capricious” test instead of the more deferential “unlawfully withheld” test 
would have encouraged greater transparency in agency decision-making. 
Introduction 
 The United States has one of the highest per capita rates of meat 
consumption in the world.1 In a recent study, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture reported that from 1950 to 2011, meat consumption in the 
United States had increased from roughly eighteen billion to nearly 
fifty-two billion pounds per year.2 To support this staggering consump-
tion, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began approving the 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–2013. 
1 Eliza Barclay, A Nation of Meat Eaters, See How It All Adds Up, NPR (June 27, 2012, 3:03 
AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2012/06/27/155527365/visualizing-a-nation-of-
meat-eaters. 
2See Janet Larsen, Peak Meat: U.S. Meat Consumption Falling, Earth Pol’y Inst. (Mar. 7, 
2012), available at http://www.earth-policy.org/data_highlights/2012/highlights25. 
2 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:E. Supp. 
use of antibiotics in food producing animals as early as the 1950s.3 Al-
though antibiotics are mostly used to treat bacterial infections,4 they are 
also believed to improve growth and feed efficiency in livestock when 
administered at subtherapeutic levels.5 In 2009 alone, the United States 
distributed nearly twenty-nine million pounds of antibiotics for use in 
food producing animals.6 
 Bacteria develop resistance to antibiotics with prolonged use and 
transfer between species through consumption of treated meat.7 Many 
of the antibiotics used for growth and feed efficiency in livestock are 
identical to those used to treat human bacterial infections.8 Accord-
ingly, human consumption of meat treated by subtherapeutic use of 
antibiotics may pose a potential public health threat.9 Pursuant to con-
gressional mandate, the FDA must therefore consider its role in regu-
lating food production10 and insuring drug safety and efficacy.11 
 In 1977, the FDA initiated a process to withdraw approval of the 
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food producing animals out of con-
cern that the use was not shown to be safe.12 The withdrawal process 
was never completed.13 Thus, several decades later, non-profit advocacy 
groups sought a court order compelling the FDA to complete the with-
drawal proceedings.14 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
3 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 131 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
4 Antibiotic Resistance Questions & Answers, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 
http://www.cdc.gov/getsmart/antibiotic-use/antibiotic-resistance-faqs.html#d (last reviewed 
May 1, 2012). 
5 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 131–32 & 131 n.3. The term “sub-
therapeutic” refers to the administration of antibiotics at levels lower than the approved 
dose for disease treatment. Id. 
6 Ctr. for Veterinary Med., Food & Drug Admin., Summary Report on Antimicro-
bials Sold or Distributed for Use in Food-Producing Animals 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/AnimalDrugUserFeeActADUFA/UC 
M231851.pdf. 
7 Antibiotic Resistance Questions & Answers, supra note 4; Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 
about Antibiotic Resistance, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, available at http:// 
www.cdc.gov/narms/faq.html#bacteria-spread (last reviewed Nov. 20, 2012). 
8 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 131 & n.2. 
9 See Antibiotic Resistance Questions & Answers, supra note 4; Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQ) About Antibiotic Resistance, supra note 7. 
10 21 U.S.C. § 350d (2006). 
11 See id. § 360b(e)(1)(B). 
12 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 133–34. 
13 See id. at 135. 
14 See id. Plaintiffs in the case included the following organizations: Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Center for Science in the Public Trust, Food Animal Concerns Trust, 
Public Citizen, and Union of Concerned Scientists. See id. at 130. 
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Food & Drug Administration, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York considered whether the FDA unlawfully withheld 
or unreasonably delayed agency action in violation of the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).15 The 
district court applied a statutory interpretation analytical framework 
under the APA’s unlawfully withheld test and ruled in the advocacy 
groups’ favor.16 
 This Comment argues that applying the arbitrary and capricious 
test instead of the unlawfully withheld test would have allowed the 
Court to hold the FDA more accountable for justifying its actions.17 
While this might not have led to as swift of a remedy for environmental 
groups, the District Court’s narrow consideration of questions of law 
reinforces a more deferential standard for judicial review instead of 
promoting transparency in agency decision-making.18 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 In the 1950s, the FDA approved the subtherapeutic use of antibiot-
ics in food producing animals for the purpose of improving growth and 
feed efficiency.19 Soon after, however, the FDA became concerned that 
long-term use of antibiotics in livestock might be hazardous to both 
human and animal health.20 Accordingly, the FDA ordered a task force 
consisting of scientists from various governmental institutes to study the 
human health risks associated with subtherapeutic uses.21 The study 
concluded that the antibiotic use “favored” the development of antibi-
otic resistant bacteria that had been found on meat and meat prod-
ucts.22 Additionally, the study found an increase in antibiotic resistant 
bacteria in humans.23 
 In response to this study and others, the FDA’s Director of the Bu-
reau of Veterinary Medicine issued notices of an opportunity for hear-
ing (NOOH) on proposals to withdraw approval of all subtherapeutic 
uses of penicillin and tetracycline in animal feed.24 Although the FDA 
                                                                                                                      
15 See id. at 137. 
16 See id. at 141–45, 151–52. 
17 See infra notes 97–109 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
19 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 131. 
20 See id. at 131–32. 
21 Id. at 132. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 133–34. 
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granted requests for hearings from drug sponsors, the hearing dates 
were postponed for “as soon as practicable.” 25 
 In lieu of hearings, the FDA pursued additional research pursuant 
to a congressional committee recommendation.26 Through the 1980s, 
various public and private health institutes assessed the associated hu-
man health risks.27 While some reports drew no conclusions as to safety, 
others found surprisingly high rates of bacterial resistance in meat 
products.28 Others found only indirect evidence to support that the 
drugs were unsafe.29 Relying on these findings, the FDA concluded in 
2003 that risks of antibiotic use in livestock were neither proved nor 
disproved, but the agency did not deny some risk.30 
 Finally, in 2010, the FDA issued non-binding draft guidance, con-
cluding that the overall weight of the evidence supported the notion 
that the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in livestock is not in the inter-
est of the public health.31 The FDA, however, did not mandate any ac-
tion beyond this draft guidance.32 
 On May 25, 2011, the Natural Resources Defense Council and 
other advocacy organizations alleged that the FDA’s failure to withdraw 
approval of the medicines violated the APA’s unlawfully withheld 
agency action test.33 While this action was pending in district court, the 
FDA rescinded the 1977 NOOHs citing ongoing alternative strategies 
and the need for an update.34 On March 22, 2012, the court ruled in 
favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the FDA to reissue a notice of the pro-
posed withdrawals and to provide an opportunity for a hearing for the 
sponsors to present evidence as to the drugs’ safety.35 According to the 
court, if the drugs were still found to be unsafe after the hearings, the 
FDA would be required to issue a withdrawal order.36 
                                                                                                                      
25 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 134. 
26 See id. at 135 (“The House Committee on Appropriations ‘recommend[ed]’ that the 
FDA conduct research regarding ‘whether or not the continued subtherapeutic use of 
[penicillin and tetracyclines] would result in any significant human health risk’ before 
revoking such approval.”). 
27 Id. at 135–36. 
28 Id. at 135. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 136. 
31 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 136. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. at 137. 
34 See id. 
35 Id. at 151–52. 
36 Id. 
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II. Legal Background 
 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) governs the Food and 
Drug Administration’s (FDA) oversight of food and drug safety.37 Un-
der the FDCA, any new animal drug must be approved by the FDA be-
fore entering interstate commerce.38 The FDA must monitor approved 
animal drugs to ensure their lasting safety and efficacy.39 To that end, if 
an approved animal drug is later shown to be not safe, the Secretary 
must take action towards withdrawing the unsafe drug.40 
  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for judicial re-
view of agency action, including those of the FDA.41 In particular, § 706 
authorizes and defines a court’s scope of review.42 The statute defines 
agency action as agency rule, order, license, sanction or relief, as well as 
the failure to act.43 The APA allows those who have suffered legal wrong 
or were adversely affected by agency action to sue agencies for relief.44 
A. Section 706(1)’s Unlawfully Withheld or Unreasonably Delayed Test 
 The APA authorizes courts to compel agency action that is “unlaw-
fully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”45 The reviewing court can only 
compel a legally required discrete agency action.46 In this way, the APA 
prevents courts from both interfering with agency discretionary func-
tion and from committing a “broad programmatic attack” on agency 
policy.47 For example, when an agency fails to act within a required 
time frame, the court can compel the agency to act, but must leave the 
manner of the action to agency discretion.48 The purpose of these limi-
tations is to protect agencies from undue judicial interference and to 
ensure that courts defer to agency technical expertise.49 
                                                                                                                      
37 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 341–42, 351 (2006). 
38 See id. §§ 331(a), 360b(a). 
39 See id. § 393b(1)–(2). 
40 See id. § 360b(e)(1)(B) (“The Secretary shall, after due notice and opportunity for 
hearing to the applicant, issue an order withdrawing approval of an application . . . with 
respect to any new animal drug if the Secretary finds . . . that such drug is not shown to be 
safe . . . .”). 
41 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
42 See id. § 706. 
43 See id. § 551(13) (defining terms within the APA). 
44 See id. § 702. 
45 See id. § 706(1). 
46 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 138. 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004)). 
47 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 138. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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 The Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Norton v. Southern Utah Wil-
derness Alliance articulates the standard for compelling agency action 
under the unlawfully withheld test.50 There, Southern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance and others, sought judicial review of the Bureau of Land Man-
agement’s (BLM) failure to protect Utah public lands from environ-
mental damage caused by off-road vehicles.51 The plaintiffs claimed 
that BLM’s failure to follow through on commitments in its land use 
plans constituted unlawfully withheld agency action.52 The Court con-
sidered whether statements in BLM’s plans could be legally binding 
commitments.53 The Court reasoned that the most natural reading of 
the governing statute defined land use plans were projections.54 Fur-
ther, absent statutory language indicative of a binding comment, “al-
lowing general enforcement of plan terms would lead to pervasive in-
terference with BLM’s own ordering of priorities.”55 According to the 
Court, the BLM’s failure to act on land use plans was not unlawfully 
withheld agency action.56 
B. Section 706(2)(a)’s Arbitrary and Capricious Test 
 The APA also authorizes courts to set aside agency actions found to 
be “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”57 
An agency decision to act is arbitrary and capricious if “the agency re-
lied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, [or] offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence . . . .”58 
Conversely, if the agency can articulate a rational connection between 
relevant facts and choices made, the agency’s decision is not arbitrary 
and capricious.59 Under this test, agencies are required to have taken a 
“hard look” at the relevant factors involved before deciding on action.60 
                                                                                                                      
50 See 542 U.S. at 62. 
51 See id. at 59–60. 
52 See id. at 60. 
53 Id. at 68. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 71. 
56 See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. at 71. 
57 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
58 See WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 741 F. Supp. 2d. 89, 97 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983)). 
59 See id. at 98. 
60 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Role of NEPA in Fuel Resource Development and Use in the 
Western United States, 39 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 283, 289 (2012) (“The courts have inter-
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 The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA applies the 
arbitrary and capricious standard in the context of unlawfully withheld 
agency action.61 Petitioners challenged the EPA’s decision not to regu-
late the emission of greenhouse gases as a violation of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard.62 The EPA justified its decision with a variety of 
policy reasons including: effective alternative responses were already 
present; the President’s ability to negotiate internationally might be 
harmed; and that curtailing motor-vehicle emissions would reflect an 
inefficient approach to addressing climate change.63 The Court held 
that the policy reasons had nothing to do with greenhouse gases con-
tribution to climate change and that the EPA failed to rationally justify 
its decision.64 The Court found the EPA’s action arbitrary and capri-
cious and required that the EPA review its action and defend it with 
proper reasoning.65 
 In Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. EPA, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the sufficiency of an 
agency’s rationale under the arbitrary and capricious standard.66 There, 
the EPA was required by statute to use a heightened safety margin when 
regulating pesticide exposure levels in infants and children.67 The EPA 
used computer modeling to determine applicable drinking water expo-
sure levels with respect to several pesticides.68 Because the results of 
those models revealed little to no risk of pesticide exposure in drinking 
water, the EPA decided to lower or remove the child margin of safety for 
each relevant pesticides.69 
 In Northwest Coalition, the plaintiffs argued that the EPA could not 
justify changing the safety margin based on reliable data because the 
results were derived from models and not actual samples.70 The Ninth 
Circuit held that because the EPA investigated the reliability of the 
models using peer review, validation, and comparison of the model’s 
predictions with extensive water monitoring data, the models were reli-
                                                                                                                      
preted the APA to require an agency to find and record facts that provide a rational basis 
for its decision, which has become known as the ‘hard look’ doctrine.”). 
61 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007). 
62 See id. at 505. 
63 Id. at 533. 
64 Id. 533–34. 
65 See id. at 534–35. 
66 See 544 F.3d 1043, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2008). 
67 Id. at 1046. 
68 Id. at 1048. 
69 See id. 
70 Id. 
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able and their use was neither arbitrary nor capricious.71 Despite the 
reliability of the methodology, however, the EPA failed to explain a ra-
tional connection between the data from the models and the decision 
to reduce the safety margin from tenfold to three fold.72 The court re-
quired the EPA to review and ground its decision in proper reasoning.73 
III. Analysis 
 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admini-
stration, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
considered the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) failure to com-
plete the withdrawal proceedings in light of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act’s (APA) unlawfully withheld test.74 Weaving its reasoning 
through several minor holdings,75 the court ultimately ruled in favor of 
compelling the FDA’s action.76 The primary issue before the court 
turned on whether the FDA’s failure to complete the withdrawal pro-
ceedings constituted a legally required discrete agency action.77 
 The court cited both Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance and 
the APA for its characterization of orders and preceding hearings as 
discrete agency actions.78 Accordingly, in Natural Resources the court 
held that all the actions leading up to the issuance of the withdrawal 
order were discrete agency actions in themselves.79 Upon finding that a 
new animal drug may not be safe, the FDA was required to provide no-
tice of its intent to withdraw, create an opportunity for a hearing, and 
finally issue an order withdrawing approval of the drug if the drug 
sponsors failed their burden of proof at the hearing.80 The issuance of 
                                                                                                                      
71 Id. at 1050. 
72 See Nw. Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides, 544 F.3d at 1052. 
73 Id. 
74 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 
137(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
75 See id. at 142, 146, 148, 149. The Court held that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s 
meaning is plain and the FDA is not owed deference for its contrary interpretation; that 
the FDA Commissioner properly authorized the Director of the Bureau of Veterinary Med-
icine to make the findings in the 1977 notices of opportunity for hearings (NOOH); that 
the Director had made such findings and initiated the withdrawal process; that the find-
ings were later adopted by the Commissioner; and that the rescission of the NOOHs did 
not render the action moot. Id. 
76 Id. at 151. 
77 See id. at 139–45. 
78 Id. at 140 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(7), (13) (2006); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alli-
ance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)). 
79 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 140. 
80 Id. 
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an order withdrawing approval, which the FDA had failed to do, consti-
tuted one of several discrete agency actions involved in the withdrawal 
process.81 In identifying these actions as discrete, the court prevented a 
broad programmatic attack on the FDA’s policies surrounding animal 
drug approval and use.82 
 The district court then held that the statute legally required the 
FDA to withdraw approval of any new animal drug found unsafe, pro-
vided that the drug sponsor had notice and an opportunity for a hear-
ing.83 According to the court, the most natural and grammatical read-
ing of the APA provides that, in issuing NOOHs based on findings that 
the drugs were unsafe, the FDA triggered a legally required duty to 
provide an opportunity for a hearing.84 The overriding purpose of the 
FDA—to promote the public health by monitoring the safety of regu-
lated drugs—supports this reading.85 This conclusion is also consistent 
with previous interpretations for the parallel human drug monitoring 
and withdrawal process.86 
 The court found that since the FDA withheld legally required dis-
crete agency action, the FDA violated the unlawfully withheld test of 
the APA.87 The court thus compelled the FDA to reissue a notice of 
proposed withdrawals, provide opportunity for a hearing to the rele-
vant drug sponsors, and order the withdrawal of the drugs if the spon-
sors fail to show that the drug use is safe.88 
 In this case, the district court properly applied the plain meaning 
of the APA and the FDA’s overarching purpose to compel the FDA’s 
unlawfully withheld action and rule in favor of the the plaintiffs.89 This 
narrow application of questions of law only, however, runs the risk of 
being overly deferential to agencies at a time when judicial review is 
essential to the development of environmental law.90 
                                                                                                                      
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 Id. at 140–42. 
84 See id. 
85 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 143. 
86 See id. at 143. 
87 Id. at 152. 
88 Id. 
89 See id. at 141–45. 
90 See Int’l Union v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 254–55 (3rd Cir. 2004) (noting that judicial 
review of agency action as unlawfully withheld is highly deferential); Eric Biber, Two Sides of 
the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 
461, 462–63 (2008) (recognizing that “[t]he future development of environmental law will 
therefore be critically affected by the nature and scope of judicial review of an agency’s 
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 Judicial review under the unlawfully withheld test generally only 
requires that an agency act pursuant to a “clear” duty to act.91 Absent 
statutory language supportive of a clear duty, agencies have broad dis-
cretion, particularly regarding resource allocation and prioritization of 
duties.92 For example, the Supreme Court in Norton v. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance avoided judicial interference in the Bureau of Land 
Management’s prioritization by reading no legally required commit-
ment in the relevant statutory language.93 Accordingly, where a court 
relies on a restrictive reading of a statute, it runs the risk of yielding 
overly deferential decisions.94 Thus, while Natural Resources is undenia-
bly a victory for the plaintiffs in this case, the court could have gone 
one step further for environmental advocates at large by implementing 
a more transparent standard for judicial review of agency action.95 
 In Natural Resources, the court defined the FDA’s failure to issue the 
withdrawal order as an action subject to judicial review.96 Accordingly, 
pursuant to section 706 of the APA, the failure to issue the withdrawal 
order can also be reviewed through the lens of the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard.97 Under the guidance of Massachusetts v. EPA, the dis-
trict court in Natural Resources would have had to consider the rational 
justification of the FDA’s decision not to issue the withdrawal orders.98 
 The FDA’s action in rescinding the 1977 NOOHs may reveal some 
of the motivations behind its failure to complete the withdrawal pro-
ceedings.99 In its defense, the FDA cited “other ongoing regulatory 
strategies developed since the publication of the 1977 NOOHs,” and 
                                                                                                                      
decision not to take on a new initiative, to abandon an initiative mid-stream, or to pursue it 
to conclusion.”). 
91 See Biber, supra note 90, at 478. 
92 See id. 
93 542 U.S. at 72. 
94 See William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and the Questionable Value of Amending the APA, 
56 Admin. L. Rev. 979, 996 (2004) (suggesting that restrictive reading of statutory lan-
guage may compromise the proper balance between agency discretion and meaningful 
judicial review). 
95 See Biber, supra note 90, at 463 (stating that the scope and nature of judicial review is 
essential to the development of environmental law); see generally Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing 
a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2 (2009) (suggesting that 
requiring transparency in agency decision-making under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of judicial review facilitates agency accountability). 
96 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 140–41. 
97 See Biber, supra note 91 at 471 (stating that both §§ 706(1) and 706(2) fall under the 
same scope of review, implying one unitary standard). 
98 See 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007). 
99 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 136–37. 
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the need to update the NOOHs to “reflect current data, information, 
and policies.”100 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court rejected similar pol-
icy justifications for the EPA’s refusal to comply with a clear statutory 
command.101 In defense of its failure to regulate greenhouse gas emis-
sions, the EPA offered the following explanations: that effective alterna-
tive responses were already present, the President’s ability to negotiate 
internationally, and that curtailing motor-vehicle emissions would re-
flect an inefficient approach to addressing climate change.102 The Su-
preme Court, however, held that none of these policy reasons could 
reasonably justify the EPA’s failure to form a scientific judgment as to 
whether greenhouse gases contribute to climate change, which would 
have required the agency to regulate emissions.103 Like the policy justi-
fications in Massachusetts v. EPA, the FDA’s defenses to inaction fail to 
provide the rationale necessary to justify its decision to postpone the 
withdrawal proceedings indefinitely.104 
 According to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Northwest Coalition for 
Alternatives to Pesticides v. EPA, the FDA would have also had to prove the 
reliability of the methodology leading to its decision and the rational 
connection between the data and its decision to not withdraw.105 There, 
the EPA’s computer modeling was justified because the EPA had inves-
tigated the reliability of the models using peer review, validation, and 
comparison of the models predictions with extensive water monitoring 
data.106 Applying this reasoning to Natural Resources would have first re-
quired that the FDA provide verification of the methods and tests it 
used to justify the decision not to regulate.107 The FDA would also have 
had to establish a rational connection between the results of verified 
studies and its decision to not withdraw.108 
 While Natural Resources presents a swift remedy for environmental 
groups, the unlawfully withheld standard on which it is based is a highly 
deferential doctrine.109 Instead of requiring agencies to use reliable and 
comprehensive studies to drive decision-making and transparency, 
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. at 136. 
101 549 U.S. at 533. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533; Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d 
at 136–37. 
105 See 544 F.3d 1043, 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2008). 
106 Id. at 1050. 
107 See Nw. Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides, 544 F.3d at 1050. 
108 See id. 
109 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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Natural Resources embraces the potential for deferential reading of 
statutory language.110 Applying the arbitrary and capricious test instead 
of the unlawfully withheld test would have allowed the Court to hold 
the FDA more accountable for transparency in its decision making.111 
Conclusion 
 In Natural Resources, the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York applied the unlawfully withheld test to compel the 
FDA to continue withdrawal proceedings initiated thirty-five years ear-
lier. The court’s consideration of the plain meaning of the statute ren-
dered a favorable and swift decision for the plaintiffs. This narrow con-
sideration of questions of law only, however, runs the risk of being 
overly deferential at a time when enforceability of judicial review in en-
vironmental law is needed most. The court could have instead required 
the FDA to rationally justify its decision under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard. Although, this test might not have led to as swift of a 
victory, it would have required the FDA take a hard look at the data, lest 
it be subject to judicial review. This heightened level of scrutiny would 
have allowed environmental advocates to hold the FDA accountable for 
transparency in decision making. 
                                                                                                                      
110 See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
111 See supra notes 100–09 and accompanying text. 
